|
The New York Times
Business; Challenging a
Corporate Addiction to Outsiders
No
one raised an eyebrow when word leaked last week that WorldCom was
wooing Michael D. Capellas, the president of Hewlett-Packard and
onetime chief executive of Compaq Computer, to be its new chief
executive. Or when Gap reached outside the fashion industry in late
September and hired Paul Pressler, who had run Disney's theme parks
and resorts unit, as its chief executive. Or when UAL, the parent
of United Airlines, found its new chief executive in Glenn F. Tilton,
the vice chairman of ChevronTexaco and a 32-year veteran of the
oil industry.
In corporate America, going outside
for top executive talent is as regular as rain; it's expected, even
though many of those superstars fail, only to be traded for another
outsider. Yet a growing body of evidence suggests that corporations
with the exception of a small advance guard that is trying
to change have it all wrong. In the war for top executive
talent, the shareholder has been the loser so much so that
some critics now argue that the succession process itself is broken.
Boards, they contend, search for chief executives the way a baseball
team recruits big-name talent, and with similar results: they create
both a perceived scarcity of eligible candidates and an overheated
market for stars that encourages excessive compensation.
"There's been an attitude that
'we can buy a C.E.O. when we need one,' " says Marc Effron
of Hewitt Associates in Lincolnshire, Ill., a consulting firm. "That's
a folly."
David R. Bliss, vice chairman of Mercer
Delta Consulting in New York, which advises companies and boards
on succession, said, "Boards have been in the wooing and attracting
business versus a more discriminating narrow assessment of C.E.O.
candidates" and the company's specific leadership and operational
needs.
A welter of new studies highlights
the problem.
*Turnover among chief executives has
soared 53 percent between 1995 and 2001, and the number of those
who left their jobs under pressure has more than doubled during
the period, according to a study of executive departures at 2,500
large, publicly traded companies by Booz Allen Hamilton.
*Companies that dismiss chief executives
are unlikely to experience improved performance under the successor,
said Margarethe F. Wiersema, a management professor at the University
of California at Irvine. Her research, to be published in the December
issue of The Harvard Business Review, examined 31 Fortune 500 companies
that dismissed their chief executives between 1996 and 1997. She
then compared financial results and the stock performance of the
companies during the first two years of the new chief executive's
tenure with the final two years of the predecessor, and found no
improvements.
*"Good to Great" (HarperCollins,
2001), the best-selling book by Jim Collins that analyzed companies
that had substantially outperformed the market and their industry
over 15 years, concluded that the best chief executives resemble
self-effacing, home-grown Jimmy Stewarts, who nurture talent at
the company, not charismatic Cary Grant-types. "Hiring outsiders
is negatively correlated" with dramatic improvements in performance,
Mr. Collins said.
*Chief executives with high "charisma
quotients" receive higher compensation than their industry
peers, even though there is "little correlation" between
superior financial performance and a manager's charisma, according
to a study led by Henry L. Tosi Jr., a management professor at the
University of Florida. Professor Tosi and his colleagues looked
at 59 companies, randomly selected from the Fortune 500, and examined
the relationships among chief executives' charisma, their compensation
packages, and the performance of their company over a 10-year period.
*The war for talent has left many
companies neglecting the development of strong senior managers,
according to Hewitt Associates. Hewitt found that while 77 percent
of major American companies said they had a leadership development
process, less than a third of them believed it was effective. "There's
an underwhelming level of investment in developing great leaders,"
Mr. Effron said. "Often, C.E.O.'s are more concerned with building
a legacy based on their own actions versus a great pipeline of leaders."
Some companies, of course, have always
excelled at leadership development and succession planning. General
Electric, for example, is known as much for producing leaders as
it is for airplane engines or light bulbs. John F. Welch Jr., the
former chief of G.E., often said that developing people was his
main job. He said he spent most of his time doing highly structured
performance reviews and teaching management seminars at Crotonville,
G.E.'s training campus in Ossining, N.Y.
"G.E. does a great job for itself,"
says Rakesh Khurana, an assistant professor at Harvard Business
School and the author of "Searching for a Corporate Savior"
(Princeton University Press, 2002).
While other companies often recruit
from G.E.'s management, Professor Khurana said, "It's not clear
that G.E. produces any better C.E.O.'s for other companies."
Those managers have developed skills peculiar to G.E. or their industry,
he said, and "it's unclear that you can transfer those skills
to other companies successfully."
Among those who have not succeeded
elsewhere is Gary C. Wendt, a former G.E. executive who was hired
two years ago to head Conseco but who stepped down as chief executive
last month.
Critics of the selection process argue
that most companies pay lip service to management development: relatively
few invest the required years of effort in the training, mentoring
and job rotation needed to develop a strong bench.
Lately, though, a few companies seem
to be focusing on insiders, often as they try to overhaul corporate
governance in the wake of recent scandals. It takes planning and
patience.
At Delphi, the maker of auto parts
that was spun off by General Motors in 1999, J. T. Battenberg III,
the chief executive, saw firsthand the erosion of G.M.'s market
share in the late 1980's and early 1990's, first under Roger B.
Smith and then under his handpicked successor, Robert C. Stempel.
In 1992, Mr. Stempel was ousted in a boardroom coup.
Though Mr. Battenberg, 59, has no
plans to retire, he has focused on succession planning with Delphi's
board from the beginning. "My job is to develop talent and
a very rich and deep talent pool" for the board to choose from,
he said.
Although about 20 percent of its corporate
officers have been hired from other companies during the last three
years, Delphi tries to promote from within and eventually aims to
fill the top slot from inside, said John D. Opie, a former vice
chairman of G.E. who is Delphi's lead director. Directors, therefore,
make a point of meeting high-potential officers and managers several
levels down in the organization.
The Delphi board maintains control
over succession, not the retiring chief executive. Directors work
on everything from identifying new talent to helping plan assignments
for promising executives so they develop broad management experience.
"I talk to someone at Delphi
a finance manager, or v.p. of administration or J. T.
almost everyday," Mr. Opie said.
Delphi directors and vice presidents
are also encouraged to communicate outside the hierarchy. For example,
engineers and vice presidents have called on Patricia C. Sueltz,
a board member who is an executive vice president at Sun Microsystems,
to discuss the development of Delphi technologies and engineering
systems.
Succession at the Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce, based in Toronto, is also shaped by a hands-on
board. Three years ago, soon after it promoted John S. Hunkin to
chief executive, the board took action. "The process that was
used to select John was pretty traditional," said William A.
Etherington, the lead director. "There was a lot of control
by the retiring C.E.O.," and the choice had evolved into a
public horse race between two insiders. "We felt there had
to be a better way," Mr. Etherington said.
Each year, Mr. Hunkin presents the
board with a list of internal candidates for top-level positions,
directing board members to get to know them. The company also has
a written contingency plan for conducting an outside search if the
need arises.
Service Corporation International,
a funeral company that had grown by acquisition, and which was accused
of grave-desecration in a class-action lawsuit last year, shuffled
its management team this summer after deciding it had to focus on
operations.
The company's new team, including
its president, Thomas L. Ryan, all are insiders. At the behest of
the board, Robert L. Waltrip, the company's founder and chief executive,
has taken on the role of mentoring the new top management recruits.
But to help maintain control over the succession process, the board
has hired Mercer Delta Consulting to advise on succession.
Several other companies also seem
to be taking a new look at insiders. Betsy J. Bernard, recently
named the president of AT&T, worked at the company for all but
5 of the last 25 years. Both Lucent Technologies and Xerox have
returned insiders to the helm after brief-but-disastrous stints
with outsiders.
Experts agree that there are times
to hire outsiders, of course, especially when a company needs a
radical shift in strategy or to get past a scandal or overcome a
credibility gap. An outsider is also needed when a company has failed
to develop a capable candidate.
Some executive recruiters, however,
argue that the risks of failure are high when executives take the
helm of a troubled company whether they come from inside
or are hired from the outside.
"It's always possible to identify
examples where outside C.E.O.'s have struggled because most of the
companies we do searches for are troubled to start with," said
Thomas J. Neff of the executive search firm Spencer Stuart in New
York.
With corporate performance still in
a slump, investors remain discontented with many corporate leaders,
and that means more turnover at the top, at least in the near term.
If boards are going to select more judiciously, they have a lot
of work to do.
(Chart)
Dismissals
of chief executives for poor performance have increased demand for
replacements . . .
Graph shows the number of performance-related replacements of chief
executives at the worlds 2,500 largest publicly traded companies
since 1995.
. . . and the tenure of corporate leaders has fallen . . .
Graph shows the mean tenure of chief executives at the same companies
since 1995.
. . . but there is some evidence that switching leaders can worsen
performance
Operating earnings as a percentage of total assets
Two years before chief is ousted: 11.2%
Two years after chief is ousted: 11.8
Return on assets
Two years before chief is ousted: 2.6%
Two years after chief is ousted: 2.4
Stock returns
Two years before chief is ousted: 8.6%
Two years after chief is ousted: 6.1
(Sources: Booz Allen Hamilton; Harvard Business Review)
Copyright 2002 The
New York Times Company
 
|